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Visual statistical learning (VSL) is the ability to extract the joint and conditional probabilities
of shapes co-occurring during passive viewing of complex visual configurations. Evidence
indicates that even infants are sensitive to these regularities (e.g., Kirkham et al., 2002).
However, there is continuing debate as to whether VSL is accompanied by conscious
awareness of the statistical regularities between sequence elements. Bertels et al.
(2012) addressed this question in young adults. Here, we adapted their paradigm to
investigate VSL and conscious awareness in children. Using the same version of the
paradigm, we also tested young adults so as to directly compare results from both
age groups. Fifth graders and undergraduates were exposed to a stream of visual
shapes arranged in triplets. Learning of these sequences was then assessed using both
direct and indirect measures. In order to assess the extent to which learning occurred
explicitly, we also measured confidence through subjective measures in the direct task
(i.e., binary confidence judgments). Results revealed that both children and young adults
learned the statistical regularities between shapes. In both age groups, participants who
performed above chance in the completion task had conscious access to their knowledge.
Nevertheless, although adults performed above chance even when they claimed to guess,
there was no evidence of implicit knowledge in children. These results suggest that the
role of implicit and explicit influences in VSL may follow a developmental trajectory.
Keywords: visual statistical learning, children, consciousness, confidence judgments, implicit and explicit
knowledge
INTRODUCTION
Statistical learning (SL) refers to the learning mechanisms that
subtend sensitivity to the statistical regularities present in the
environment. This process is essential when facing a complex
environment. In particular, learning of transitional probabilities is
crucial to predict upcoming events on the basis of previous ones.
Congruently, many authors have documented such an ability to
extract statistical regularities from auditory and visual inputs in
adults, children and infants (for a review of SL across develop-
ment, see Krogh et al., 2013).
Statistical learning is usually thought of as a form of implicit
learning, which is a fundamental and ubiquitous process in
cognition (Perruchet and Pacton, 2006). As a matter of fact, the
occurrence of SL has been observed in infants (Saffran et al., 1996;
Kirkham et al., 2002; Bulf et al., 2011) as well as in non-human
primates (Goujon and Fagot, 2013; Rakoczy et al., 2014). More-
over, SL occurs incidentally, that is even when participants are
not informed about the existence of regularities in the material.
It also occurs outside the focus of attention, that is, even when
participants are engaged in an unrelated concurrent task (e.g.,
Saffran et al., 1997; but see Turk-Browne et al., 2005). Remarkably,
SL is observed even though most participants do not report any
conscious knowledge of the regularities (e.g., Kim et al., 2009;
Arciuli and Simpson, 2011, 2012).
Therefore, the knowledge acquired through SL has generally
been taken to be implicit, a perspective that is tacitly assumed by
most authors in this domain, who generally tend to consider that
any SL process always takes place outside awareness. However, this
assumption has seldom been tested directly.
To the best of our knowledge, Kim et al. (2009) were the first to
tackle this issue. These authors investigated whether the statistical
regularities between geometrical shapes can be learned outside
awareness. Based on a dissociation between direct and indirect
measures of learning (i.e., in which task instructions respectively
do or do not explicitly refer to the to-be-learned dimension),
they concluded that participants learned the sequences implicitly.
However, in a replication of their study using more sensitive
and subjective measures of the acquired knowledge, Bertels et al.
(2012) demonstrated that participants’ performance was not
exclusively based on implicit knowledge. On the contrary, visual
statistical learning (VSL) was mostly based on explicit knowledge
acquisition (see also Bertels et al., 2013).
In their studies, following Kim et al. (2009), Bertels et al.
(2012, 2013) first exposed participants to a stream of stimuli
made up of the repeated presentation of 12 shapes, each of
them being part of a triplet, namely a sequence of three visual
shapes presented successively in a fixed order. Crucially, triplets
could not be segmented on the basis of any spatial or temporal
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cue, as each shape was centrally presented and as the inter-
stimulus interval was held constant within and across triplets. The
transitional probabilities between shapes are therefore stronger
within a triplet (P= 1.0) than between any two triplets (P= 0.33).
After this exposure phase, participants were faced with a rapid
serial visual presentation (RSVP) test, in which they had to detect
as fast as possible a target shape in a continuous stream made
by the random succession of the triplets. The rationale was that
if participants learned the statistical regularities of the triplets
during the exposure phase, reaction times (RTs) should be faster
to the second and third, predictable elements of each triplet than
to the first, unpredictable element. In a subsequent completion
task, participants had to choose on each trial the missing shape in
a series of to-be-completed triplets. They had to choose between
four alternatives and were also asked to evaluate on a binary scale
whether they remembered or guessed which one was the missing
shape. Here, we use a similar paradigm in order to investigate the
implicit vs. explicit nature of VSL in children.
Learning of statistical contingencies, be they spatial or tempo-
ral, has been studied in typically developing children (e.g., Saffran
et al., 1997; Arciuli and Simpson, 2011, 2012; Couperus et al.,
2011) as well as in specific populations such as children with
high functioning autism (Mayo and Eigsti, 2012) and children
with specific language impairment (Evans et al., 2009). Most
studies reported effective learning, supporting that SL is an early
maturing ability. Nevertheless, research in children suffers from
the same limitation as the adult literature. The extent to which SL
can actually take place outside participants’ awareness has indeed
seldom been addressed directly.
In the field of implicit learning however, the implicit vs.
explicit nature of the knowledge acquired by children has been
addressed. For instance, using the sequence learning paradigm,
Thomas and Nelson (2001) distinguished between participants
who had gained explicit knowledge of the sequence or not, and
observed that the explicit group showed larger learning effects
than the implicit group. Recently, using the same paradigm,
Weiermann and Meier (2012) even reported that children only
learned the sequences when they acquired substantial explicit
knowledge. These results highlight the importance of considering
the nature of the acquired knowledge in developmental studies of
SL, as conscious knowledge may in fact exert a substantial effect
on performance.
In the present study, we adapted Bertels et al.’s (2012)
paradigm to children, that is, we slowed down the pace of the
tasks and made them as engaging as possible. Our procedure
departs from previous studies on VSL in children (e.g., Arciuli
and Simpson, 2011, 2012) for two main reasons. First, we used
an indirect measure of learning (i.e., the RSVP detection task)
in addition to the direct measure (here, a completion task). As
participants are required to respond on the basis of their explicit
knowledge in the direct but not in the indirect task, if the indirect
task detects some knowledge that is left undetected by the direct
task, this knowledge can be considered as unconscious (Reingold
and Merikle, 1988). Second, we used subjective measures of
performance (i.e., confidence judgments), in addition to objective
measures. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that
uses confidence judgments with children in a SL task (but see, e.g.,
Berch and Evans, 1973, for the use of confidence judgments in an
explicit memory task).
The combined use of confidence judgments and objective
measures of performance will allow us to investigate the explicit
vs. implicit nature of the acquired knowledge. If children learn
explicitly, knowledge should not only be above the objective
threshold (the chance level in the completion task), but also
above the subjective threshold (Cheesman and Merikle, 1984): they
should be more confident in correct than in incorrect comple-
tion trials, based on the notion that they should know when
they are using their statistical knowledge. This relation between
confidence and accuracy indicates conscious knowledge by the
zero-correlation criterion (Dienes et al., 1995). If learning takes
place implicitly, performance should be above the objective but
below the subjective threshold of consciousness as performance
and confidence should not be related to each other. Rather, per-
formance should be above chance even when participants claim
to guess in the completion task, which indicates unconscious
knowledge by the guessing criterion (Dienes et al., 1995).
We tested a sample of four- and fifth-graders as Koriat and
Ackerman (2010) demonstrated that second- and third-graders
are significantly less able than older children to monitor the
correctness of their answers. We also recruited a group of young
adults and used the exact same methodology. This comparative
approach allowed us to assess the effect of age (1) in learning
statistical regularities from sequentially presented visual informa-
tion (as assessed through RTs in the RSVP task), (2) in using
the acquired knowledge in a subsequent direct task (as assessed
by completion performance), (3) in expressing confidence in
the rightness of one’s own responses (as assessed by confidence
ratings), and, crucially, (4) in consciously accessing the acquired
knowledge (as assessed by the correlation between completion
scores and confidence ratings).
Based on previous studies showing effective SL in children and
adults (e.g., Arciuli and Simpson, 2011, 2012; Bertels et al., 2012,
2013), we predict successful learning in both groups of partici-
pants, as reflected by (1) faster detection of shapes appearing in
predictable locations in the RSVP task (even though we expect
children to respond slower than young adults overall), and (2)
above-chance performance in the completion task.
Previous studies using direct measures of learning have
demonstrated that SL follows a developmental trajectory whereby
learning improves with age (e.g., Vaidya et al., 2007; Arciuli and
Simpson, 2011, 2012; but see Saffran et al., 1997). Age effects have
also been reported in the broader field of implicit learning, at least
when participants were explicitly instructed to learn a sequence
(Karatekin et al., 2007) or when explicit instructions were used at
test while learning was incidental (Witt et al., 2013). We therefore
expect to observe better performance in adults than in children in
the direct completion task.
Analysis of the subjective confidence judgments will be infor-
mative concerning the explicit or implicit nature of SL. Regard-
ing young adults, we expect to replicate results from Bertels
et al. (2012, 2013) namely that VSL is based on a mixture of
implicit and explicit knowledge. What about the effect of age
on the implicit vs. explicit nature of learning? Even though
consciousness has become the topic of numerous studies during
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the past 20 years, very few of them addressed the issue of the
development of conscious awareness. Most theoretical models
consider that, during development, some form of improvement
takes place regarding the cognitive abilities generally associated
with conscious processing in adults, such as verbal access, explicit
memory, and cognitive control (Perner and Dienes, 2003; Zelazo,
2004; Cleeremans, 2006). Recently, Daltrozzo and Conway (2014)
developed a model of statistical-sequential learning across the
life span, according to which the “basic” and “expert” systems
composing SL would differ regarding their developmental trajec-
tories. The “basic” system would mostly depend on automatic
and implicit mechanisms. Available since birth, its contribution
would decline until adulthood and then grow again in old age.
Conversely, the “expert” system would rely on top-down explicit
mechanisms. It would gradually develop from the early childhood
into adulthood, and then decline in the elderly. The basic and
the expert systems would thus coexist early in life, but their
contribution to SL would develop inversely.
As a consequence, we do not expect learning to be exclu-
sively implicit in the children group. Rather, we expect that,
as adults, their performance would rely on the acquisition of
both implicit and explicit knowledge. Nevertheless, following
Daltrozzo and Conway’s (2014) model, we expect a qualitative
dissociation regarding the respective influences of implicit and
explicit learning in both age groups. Specifically, children would
rely more on implicit and less on explicit knowledge than adults.
We thus expect higher performance in children than in adults
when they correctly guessed the missing shape in the completion
task. We also expected a larger Chan difference in adults than in
children. In other words, we expect the difference in confidence
between correct and incorrect responses to be larger in adults than
in children.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
One hundred and seven individuals took part in the study. All
reported (corrected-to-) normal vision. There were two groups.
The first group consisted of 54 fourth and fifth graders (24 girls),
typically developing (i.e., from general education and with no
reported disabilities), ranging from 9 years and 7 months old to
12 years and 3 months old (M = 10 years and 9 months old).
They were recruited from three primary schools (one in Belgium,
two in France, all French-speaking) and volunteered for the study
after one of the parents had given their informed consent. The
data from six participants (three girls) were discarded from the
analyses: two because the experiment had to be interrupted before
the end, two because they did not pay enough attention to the
stream during Exposure (namely, their average detection rate of
cartoon characters in the cover task was more than two standard
deviations below the mean performance), and two because their
average RT on the RSVP task was more than two standard
deviations above the overall average RT.
The second group consisted of 53 students of the Université
Libre de Bruxelles (45 women), ranging from 17 to 24 years old
(M = 19 years and 9 months old). They were tested at the Center
of Research in Cognition and Neurosciences and received course
credits for their participation. The data from three participants
(three women) were discarded from the analyses: two because
their average RT on the RSVP task was more than two stan-
dard deviations above the overall average performance, and one
because their mean error rate was above the same criterion.
This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the
Psychological and Educational Sciences Faculty of the Université
Libre de Bruxelles and conforms to the relevant regulatory stan-
dards.
STIMULI
The visual stimuli consisted of 12 black shapes presented on a
white background, adapted from Fiser and Aslin (2001). Each
stimulus was about 3 cm wide and 3 cm high. Stimuli constituted
four “triplets,” namely four sequences of three stimuli presented
in a fixed order (Figure 1). Similarly to previous studies (Arciuli
and Simpson, 2011, 2012) and as no effect of stimulus make-
up was previously found (Bertels et al., 2012), we only used one
arrangement of four triplets in the present study.
APPARATUS
Stimulus presentation, timing, and data collection were con-
trolled using the Psyscope USB button box and Psyscope X
software (Cohen et al., 1993) running on a MacBook 2.26 GHz
Intel Core 2 Duo.
FIGURE 1 | Groups of three shapes constituting each of the four
triplets, by order of presentation (1, 2, 3).
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PROCEDURE
The exposure phase was followed by a surprise test phase consist-
ing of a RSVP detection task (indirect measure of learning) and
a four alternatives forced choice (4AFC) completion task (direct
measure).
Exposure
Exposure consisted of 1260 trials divided in four blocks, each of
them consisting of 25 repetitions of each of the 12 shapes consti-
tuting the triplets plus 15 trials consisting in the presentation of
a cartoon character (the Marsupilami, Homer Simpson, Bill, or
Titeuf, depending on the block). Stimuli were presented one at a
time, for 250 ms, with a 250 ms ISI (for similar presentation rates,
see Bertels et al., 2013), resulting in an exposure phase of about
10 min. Each of the 12 shapes was presented in the fixed order
defined by the triplet it was part of. Participants were not told
about the presence of regularities in the sequence. Triplets were
pseudo-randomly presented: a given triplet was never presented
twice in a row. The presentation of the shapes was randomly
interspersed with the presentation of the cartoon character. As a
cover task, participants were asked to detect the cartoon character
by pressing the right key. This procedure was used to ensure
that participants paid attention to the stimuli presented in the
exposure phase without explicitly drawing their attention to the
sequence of shapes. These data were not considered in the analyses
but were used to discard participants who did not detect enough
of them (see above).
RSVP task
The first test consisted in a RSVP paradigm in which participants
had to detect a target within a stream of stimuli. On each trial,
the presentation of the target (1 of the 12 shapes presented
during Exposure) was followed by the presentation of the four
triplets, one shape at time, at the same rate as during Exposure.
Participants were asked to press the right key as soon as they
saw the target. The RSVP stream was then interrupted, and the
next target was presented. The RSVP task began with two practice
trials. Then, each target shape was presented four times, in the
second or third triplet in the RSVP stream, resulting in 48 test
trials. Trials were randomly presented across participants.
Completion task
The second test consisted in a 4AFC task in which participants
were presented with a triplet in which one shape was missing.
They were informed that these triplets were presented before. On
each trial, the triplet was first presented twice, one shape at a
time at the same rate as during Exposure, with a question mark
in place of the missing shape. Then, the three shapes (including
the question mark) were displayed side by side on the top of the
screen, in the order defined by the triplet. Participants had to
pick one shape among four presented underneath to complete the
triplet. These shapes were part of the triplets presented before, and
their position corresponded to the position of the missing shape
in the to-be-completed triplet. Participants responded by pressing
one of four keys (in case of children, the experimenter pressed the
key corresponding to the child’s answer). No time constraint was
imposed.
The completion task began with two practice trials for which
participants received no feedback. Then, each triplet was pre-
sented six times, resulting in 24 test trials. The same missing shape
in the first, second or third location was thus presented twice,
with a different presentation order of the four possible shapes.
The sequence of completion trials was randomly presented across
participants.
After each trial, participants expressed a binary confidence
judgment regarding their completion response. They had to indi-
cate whether they had guessed (i.e., they had no idea whatsoever
concerning the correct response, they had answered at random) or
remembered (i.e., they felt that their response was based on some
recall of the learning material, even if they were not sure at all) by
pressing one of two keys (for similar labels, see Dienes and Seth,
2010; Bertels et al., 2012, 2013). Again, the experimenter pressed
the key corresponding to the child’s answer.
RESULTS
DID PARTICIPANTS LEARN THE STATISTICAL REGULARITIES?
In the RSVP task, misses and erroneous detections consisted of
13.108% of the trials in the group of children, and 6.208% of the
trials in the group of young adults. A one-way analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) showed that the percentage of errors was signifi-
cantly larger in children than in young adults, F(1,97) = 39.132,
p < 0.001. Subsequent analyses were performed on correct RTs
only.
A mixed ANOVA was applied on response latencies, with
Group (two levels: children, adults) as a between-subjects factor
and Position (three levels: 1, 2, 3) as a within-subject factor. This
analysis revealed a significant effect of Group, F(1,96) = 182.837,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.656, indicating that young adults responded
faster than children (402 vs. 507 ms). Crucially, the effect of
Position was also significant, F(2,192) = 44.704, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.318. Bonferroni adjusted comparisons revealed that RTs
in Position 3 (427 ms) were significantly faster than in Positions
1 and 2 (465 and 470 ms), both p < 0.001, which failed to
differ from each other, F < 1. The interaction between Group
and Position was not significant, F(2,192) = 2.664, p = 0.072,
η2p = 0.0271 (see Figure 2). These results indicate that, on average,
participants had learned the triplets.
DID PARTICIPANTS EXPLOIT THEIR STATISTICAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE
COMPLETION TASK?
Completion performance across age groups was 29.762%
(SD = 14.67%) and differed significantly from chance-level
(25%), t(97)= 3.211, p= 0.002. This result indicates that, overall,
participants used their sequence knowledge in the completion
task.
A non-parametric Mann–Whitney test revealed, however, that
the proportion of correctly completed trials did not significantly
differ between children (27.431%, SD = 11.936%) and young
1Another ANOVA was performed on z-scores of RT in order to cancel any
effect of the difference in response speed between groups. This analysis
confirmed the significant main effect of Position. The interaction between
Position and Group and the main effect of Group turned out to be non-
significant (both F < 1).
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FIGURE 2 | Mean detection latencies for the three item positions (Pos1, Pos2, Pos3) in the RSVP task, by group of participants. Error bars represent
95% of confidence intervals around the means.
adults (32.01%, SD = 16.713%; U = 1084.5, p = 0.408)2. In
line with this result, the proportion of participants who per-
formed at chance (i.e., obtaining only 25% or less of correct
responses, n = 45) did not differ between groups (n = 23 in
the children group and n = 22 in the young adults group, χ2(1,
n= 98) = 0.151, p= 0.697).
WERE PARTICIPANTS CONFIDENT IN THEIR COMPLETION
PERFORMANCE?
Overall, participants judged that they remembered which was
the missing shape in 54.167% of the cases (SD = 26.508%)
and that they guessed in the remaining 45.833%. A one-
way ANOVA revealed that confidence (i.e., the percentage of
“remember” responses) significantly differs between age groups,
F(1,97) = 9.489, p = 0.003. While children judged that they
remembered in 62.24% of the cases (SD = 19.814%), young
adults’ confidence dropped to 46.417% (SD = 29.822%). Five
participants (one child, four adults) claimed to guess on every
trial and therefore reported no “remember” responses. Two par-
ticipants (one child, one adult) claimed to remember on every
trial. It thus appears that children have a liberal metacognitive
bias, namely a “tendency to give high confidence ratings, all else
being equal” (Fleming and Lau, 2014, p. 5).
2This analysis was chosen because completion scores were not normally
distributed. An additional one-way ANOVA on normalized data (square
root transformation) also indicated that the main effect of Group was non-
significant [F(1, 96) = 1.472, p = 0.228].
DID PARTICIPANTS HAVE CONSCIOUS ACCESS TO THEIR STATISTICAL
KNOWLEDGE?
We limited this analysis to participants who performed above
chance in the completion task (n = 53), that is who acquired
knowledge of the statistical contingencies according to the direct
measure of learning (for a similar procedure, see Bertels et al.,
2012, 2013). We investigated whether their knowledge was above
the subjective criterion of consciousness, namely whether they
had metaknowledge about their statistical knowledge. To this aim,
we used two indicators often used in implicit learning studies (see
Gaillard et al., 2014, for a review): the zero-correlation criterion
(Chan, 1992) and the guessing criterion (Dienes et al., 1995).
The zero-correlation criterion is met when there is no rela-
tionship between confidence and performance. In other words,
if high and low confidence ratings are randomly assigned to
correct and incorrect discriminations. Conversely, if performance
is based on conscious knowledge, participants should be more
confident in their correct responses than in their errors (Chan,
1992). According to the guessing criterion, knowledge is below the
subjective threshold of consciousness when performance is above
chance while participants claim to guess.
Completion performance reached 36% of correct responses
(SD = 9.151%) in children (n = 25) and 42.56% (SD = 15.06%)
in young adults (n = 28). Children who performed above
chance reported to remember the missing shape in 63.5% of
the cases (SD = 21.425%), while young adults who performed
above chance reported to remember it in 53.72% of the cases
(SD = 29.427%).
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FIGURE 3 | Proportion of Remember and Guess responses in participants who performed above chance level in the completion task, represented
separately for correct and incorrect completions, in children and adults. Error bars represent 95% of confidence intervals around the means.
We observed that participants who performed above chance
in the completion task made significantly more “remember”
judgments when they were correct than incorrect (Chan differ-
ence = 12.097, SD = 19.131), t(52) = 4.603, p < 0.001, were
they children (Chan difference = 13.355, SD = 20.263) or young
adults (Chan difference = 10.973, SD = 18.361), t(24) = 3.295,
p = 0.003 and t(27) = 3.162, p = 0.004, respectively (see
Figure 3). A one-way ANOVA revealed that these differences
did not differ significantly between groups, F < 1. These results
indicate conscious knowledge by the zero-correlation criterion in
both age groups.
Participants who performed above chance in the comple-
tion task did so even when they claimed to guess the correct
shape [in 30.839% of the cases, SD = 17.834%, t(50) = 2.338,
p = 0.023]. Nevertheless, a one-way ANOVA indicated that
these scores differed as a function of Group, F(1,50) = 4.571,
p = 0.038 (see Figure 4), revealing that this was only the
case for young adults who performed above chance [35.702%,
SD = 18.108%, t(26) = 3.071, p = 0.005], but not for children
(25.368%, SD = 16.178%, t < 1). According to the guessing
criterion, these results suggest that completion performance was
at least partly based on unconscious knowledge in young adults,
but not in children. Besides, when they reported to remember
the correct shape, children and adults’ performances did not
significantly differ from each other (41.904%, SD = 13.266
and 50.227%, SD = 22.796, respectively), F(1,50) = 2.456,
p= 0.124.
Nevertheless, to ascertain that this null result denotes an
absence of implicit knowledge in the children group (null hypoth-
esis), we computed a Bayes factor (BF), the value of which
indicates evidence either for the null or for the tested hypothesis.
Values below 1/3 constitute evidence for the null hypothesis;
values above 3 support the experimental hypothesis. A BF of 1
is exactly neutral between the two theories, and values between
1/3 and 3 reflect insensitive data on the basis of which no strong
conclusions can be drawn. We computed the BF on the difference
between children performance when they report to guess and a
chance level of 25%. Mean difference was 0.368%, with a standard
error of 3.315 (derived from the t-value of the one-sample t-
test against chance, 0.111). We used a normal distribution as to
remain neutral regarding the direction of the difference between
children and adults. This distribution has a mean of 10.702% (i.e.,
the mean difference between performance and chance level in
the adult group, also when they claim to guess) and a standard
deviation of 5.351%. In other words, we ran that Bayes analysis in
order to make sure that the difference observed between chance
level and completion scores in children does not belong to the
distribution of the corresponding difference in adults. Using an
online calculator3, we obtained a BF of 0.14 (<1/3), indicating
evidence for the null hypothesis4.
3http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/Bayes.htm
4However, one could argue that, since we observed higher performance in
adults than in children when they reported to guess, we should use a uniform
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FIGURE 4 | Proportion of correct and incorrect completions when participants who performed above chance level in the completion task claimed to
guess, represented separately for children and adults. Error bars represent 95% of confidence intervals around the means.
DID COMPLETION PERFORMANCE REVEAL ALL THE ACQUIRED
KNOWLEDGE?
We investigated whether participants who performed at chance in
the completion task (n = 45) actually learned the triplets during
exposure based on their results in the indirect RSVP task.
A mixed measures ANOVA with Group as a between-subjects
factor and Position as a within-subject factor revealed that RTs dif-
fered between target positions in the RSVP task, F(2,86)= 15.343,
p< 0.001,= 0.263. RTs were faster in Position 3 than in Positions
1 and 2 (429 vs. 467 and 472 ms, respectively), both p < 0.001.5
As in the overall analysis, the main effect of Group was significant,
rather than a normal distribution when computing the Bayes factor. Using
an uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 10.702, we obtained a BF of 0.42,
indicating more support for the null hypothesis than for the existence of an
effect (as it is smaller than 1), but also indicating that the data are not sensitive
enough to firmly conclude in one or the other direction. More data should be
collected in further studies.
5Interestingly, a mixed measures ANOVA including the between-subjects
factor Chance Level in the completion task (two levels: Above/At) revealed that
this effect of Position was not modulated by Chance Level (F < 1), suggesting
that both groups of participants performed similarly in the RSVP detection
task.
F(1,43)= 71.473, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.624, and indicates that young
adults (407 ms, SD= 38) responded faster than children (504 ms,
SD = 66 ms). The interaction between both factors was not
significant, F(2,86) = 1.573, p= 0.213.
The observed dissociation between direct and indirect mea-
sures of learning in participants who performed at chance in the
completion task supports the idea that, in both age groups, these
participants acquired statistical knowledge that cannot be used
intentionally in the direct task.
DISCUSSION
In this study, 9- to 12-year-old children and young adults took
part in a VSL experiment in which learning was assessed indirectly
through a RSVP detection task and directly through a 4AFC com-
pletion task. Subjective confidence judgments were also collected
in this latter task in order to investigate the explicit or implicit
nature of the acquired knowledge.
Rapid serial visual presentation results show that participants
from both age groups learned in a similar fashion. The results
of the completion task indicate that about half the participants
were able to use their knowledge to identify the missing shape in
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incomplete triplets. Results also show that those who performed
at chance in the completion task nevertheless learned the regular-
ities as assessed by their RT results.
Children and adults’ completion performances do not differ
from each other. Our results therefore suggest that VSL abilities
are mature at 10 years of age. Nevertheless, as we will discuss
below, the nature of their knowledge may not be identical.
At first sight, this may seem surprising, as previous studies
have reported age effects in spatial and temporal SL. Indeed, even
though most authors investigating the developmental aspects of
SL have observed successful learning both in adults and children
groups (Dixon et al., 2010; Couperus et al., 2011; Arciuli and
Simpson, 2012; but see Vaidya et al., 2007), more effective SL has
usually been observed in adults than in children (but see Saffran
et al., 1997). Investigating VSL in 5–12 years, Arciuli and Simpson
(2011) reported that learning improves with age, also supporting
that SL follows a developmental trajectory.
The fact that children and adults performance did not differ
from each other does not necessarily speak against these con-
clusions. Most probably, the difficulty of the completion task
may have weakened potential differences in performance between
age groups (even in adults, the average performance reached
only 32%, while chance level was 25%). Using a wider range
of children’s ages would presumably induce stronger develop-
mental effects, with children performance increasing with age, as
observed by Arciuli and Simpson (2011).
However, as we had to measure confidence to investigate age
differences in the nature of the acquired knowledge, we did not
recruit younger children. Indeed, children under 9 years of age
may be less able to assess the correctness of their responses (Koriat
and Ackerman, 2010). Further studies using the same paradigm
(although without or with adapted confidence judgments) should
investigate the developmental course of implicit and explicit VSL
across younger children.
Although average performance was above chance, approxi-
mately half of the participants in each group responded at chance
in the completion task. Interestingly, those participants showed
intact learning in the RSVP task. This result supports that these
participants acquired knowledge of the sequences that cannot
be used intentionally in the completion task. Such dissociation
between direct and indirect performance has often been consid-
ered as an indication of implicit learning (e.g., Kim et al., 2009).
However, as convincingly shown by Shanks and Perruchet (2002),
such dissociation between tasks does not necessarily indicate a
corresponding dissociation between conscious and unconscious
knowledge. Rather, it may merely reflect the fact that both mea-
sures are imperfectly correlated and not equally sensitive to the
acquired knowledge. As a consequence, the simple dissociation
between direct and indirect performance provides only moderate
evidence for implicit VSL in both age groups. More interesting is
the qualitative dissociation between performance and confidence
in participants who performed above chance in the completion
task.
The other half of participants in each group reached above
chance performance in the completion task. Looking at the
subjective confidence measures, we checked the amount of cor-
rect completions made with no confidence. In young adults,
completion scores were above chance even when they claimed
to guess the missing shape. Such an effect has been previously
reported in the implicit learning literature. For example, in arti-
ficial grammar learning studies where participants had to classify
strings of letters as grammatical or not, several authors (Dienes
et al., 1995; Tunney and Shanks, 2003; Scott and Dienes, 2008)
have found above chance performance even when participants
attributed responses to random selection. Other studies, using
the sequence learning paradigm have also found that participants
cannot help generating the training sequence above the chance
level when instructed not to do so (Destrebecqz and Cleeremans,
2001; Fu et al., 2008). Such a result suggests that the expression of
the acquired knowledge was not entirely under conscious control.
According to Scott and Dienes (2008), these effects are consistent
with the notion that behavior reflects, at least to some extent, the
unconscious influence of familiarity.
Further results in the adult group showed that accuracy in the
completion task was reliably related to confidence however. In
particular, these adults who performed above chance were more
confident when they correctly identified the missing shape than
when they were mistaken. Hence, the pattern of results found
in adults corresponds to the typical observation that subjective
measures indicate the existence of some unconscious knowl-
edge according to the guessing criterion and some conscious
knowledge according to the zero-correlation criterion. Typically,
participants acquire both conscious and unconscious knowledge
(Dienes and Scott, 2005; Bertels et al., 2012, 2013).
Surprisingly, children’s performance does not show uncon-
scious influence on performance, neither through the guessing
criterion nor through the zero-correlation criterion, although
adults’ does (at least through the guessing criterion). This is in
contradiction with Daltrozzo and Conway’s (2014) model that
postulates a greater involvement of implicit mechanisms (i.e., of
the “basic” system) in childhood than in adulthood. On the basis
of this model, we indeed expected that children’s performance
would rely more on implicit and less on explicit knowledge than
adults’ performance. Specifically, we predicted that (1) children
would outperform adult when they both reported to guess and
that (2) the difference in confidence level reported in correct
and incorrect trials would be larger in adults than in children.
We instead observed that (1) children, unlike adults, performed
at chance when they claimed to guess and that (2) a similar
difference in confidence between correct and incorrect trials was
found in both age groups.
Should we then consider learning in the children group as
more “conscious” than in the adult group? Not necessarily. In his
theoretical model of unconscious cognition, Cleeremans (2006)
proposed that availability to consciousness may paradoxically
decrease with the acquisition of “high quality” representations.
In his framework, “quality of representation” designates several
properties of memory traces, such as their relative strength, their
distinctiveness, or their stability in time. The model also states
that the emergence of high-quality representations takes time
over development. At first, learning is best described as “implicit”
because the relevant representations are too weak to be controlled
by the system. At a second stage, explicit representations begin
to emerge and may serve as the basis of responding in direct
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measures of learning. Finally, as the quality of the representations
continues to increase through practice or over development, the
corresponding content of phenomenal experience may simulta-
neously decrease as these representations are no longer part of
the central focus of awareness and as their potential influence on
behavior does not need to be consciously monitored anymore.
According to Cleeremans (2008), “conscious experience occurs if
and only if an information processing system has learned about
its own representations of the world” (p. 23). In his view, contents
can be accessed consciously “provided [. . .] that the system has
learned about its representations by itself, over its development”
(p. 23). Hence, in our study, adults may require less focus on
the relevant regularities to reach a similar level of performance
as children. This may explain why children performance revealed
less unconscious influences than adults when subjective measures
are used.
Arguably, our results may be biased by the children’s high
confidence (at least higher than the level of confidence found in
adults). For instance, if children expressed too much confidence
in their errors, one might have expected a smaller Chan difference
in children than in adults. As Chan differences are computed
on confidence judgments considered separately for correct and
erroneous responses, such a difference would reflect a bias in
children’s assessment of confidence rather than a true difference
in the nature of learning taking place in both age groups6. In
particular, one might have predicted the Chan difference to be
smaller in children than in adults if children were specifically too
confident in their errors. However, Chan differences were similar
and reliably above 0 in both age groups.
A liberal metacognitive bias in children may have also resulted
in lower performance in “remember” trials in children than in
adults. Indeed, being overconfident would lead children to report
to remember the answer although it was incorrect. However, chil-
dren and adult performance did not statistically differ from each
other. Taken together, these data support that the children higher
level of confidence did not influence completion performance
and the criteria we used to assess the nature of their statistical
knowledge.
Why were children more confident than young adults,
although the same instructions were given in both groups? We
cannot rule out the possibility that the presence of an adult exper-
imenter who accompanied children through the task urged them
to report confidence, either because the children did not want to
admit they were unconfident in front of that person or because
she was so reinsuring that she boosted children’s self-confidence.
6We are aware that most authors (including Bertels et al., 2012, 2013)
submitted confidence judgments to Type II SDT analysis, in which Hits
correspond to correct discriminations made with high confidence and False
Alarms to incorrect discriminations made with high confidence (Kunimoto
et al., 2001). This procedure results in Type II d′ representing participants’
awareness of their own performance and claimed to be an unbiased measure
of awareness, unaffected by participants’ own report criterion in making high
and low confidence judgments (Kunimoto et al., 2001; Tunney and Shanks,
2003). Nevertheless, recent studies have shown that Type II d′ are in fact not
independent from metacognitive bias (e.g., Galvinet et al., 2003; Evans et al.,
2007; Barrett et al., 2013; Fleming and Lau, 2014). We therefore did not use this
analysis in the present study. We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing
this literature to our attention.
This point should be controlled for in further studies. It is also
possible that children and adults understood the instructions in
different ways. However, as described in the next section, we tried
to make the instructions as clear and explicit as possible in order
to avoid any misunderstanding in participants in both age groups.
The two labels we used for the confidence judgments were
chosen in order to obtain the most exhaustive measure of con-
scious knowledge possible. As we did in our previous studies,
we made clear to the participants that they had to say “Guess”
when they had no idea or intuition whatsoever concerning the
missing shape, they could just as well flip a coin to determine their
answer. We explicitly told them that a “Guess” meant no conscious
feeling of familiarity or recall whatsoever. This was done in
order to ensure that above chance performance when claiming
to guess effectively measures the influence of implicit knowledge.
Alternatively, they had to say “Remember” following any recall of
the learning material, even held with very low confidence. Still,
in case participants’ response was based on intuition, one might
wonder which option to choose. Indeed, although a response
based on intuitive feelings implies that the participant is not
completely guessing, he/she did not recall the learning material
either. Therefore, further studies should use clarified labels such as
“Guess” vs. “Some confidence,” without referring to any recall of
the material. Intuitive responses would then clearly be associated
to the “Some confidence” option.
An additional scale should be used to obtain a more precise
assessment of the knowledge held by participants with some level
of confidence. Indeed, while our subjective measures are con-
cerned with what Dienes and Scott (2005) have called “judgment
knowledge,” i.e., knowing ofwhat is the missing shape, we have no
information about what they have called “structural knowledge,”
i.e., knowing ofwhy this is the missing shape. In some cases, adults
judged that they were guessing while they were above chance.
Such a pattern of results indicates unconscious judgment knowl-
edge, which is necessarily associated with unconscious structural
knowledge. If one does not know that he knows the missing shape,
he could not know why he knows it. In the children group by con-
trast, participants demonstrated conscious judgment knowledge.
But conscious judgment knowledge can be coupled with either
conscious or unconscious structural knowledge. Children may
know that they know which shape is the missing shape but their
corresponding phenomenal experience may be intuition rather
than conscious identification of the reasons why a given shape is
the missing one (see Dienes and Scott, 2005, p. 339). Therefore, in
further studies, we recommend (1) to assess judgment knowledge
by using binary confidence judgments with clarified labels such
as “Guess” vs. “Some confidence,” and (2) to ask participants to
indicate after each judgment the basis of their judgment (e.g.,
guess, intuition, rules, memory, as in Dienes and Scott, 2005).
This will be useful in testing whether children outperform adult
participants regarding the conscious status of their structural
knowledge.
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